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1. Introduction
The constitution of the European Monetary Union has brought back to light an issue, that has
been discussed in a global context for a long time – the existence of common elements in national
business cycles.1 As, among others, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and Tavlas (1993) have
noted, monetary integration in case of insufﬁcient similarities between the participating countries
may lead to high costs of the integration process due to improper coordination between national
economic ﬂuctuations and supranational monetary policy. Whether there exists what might be
called a “European business cycle” therefore plays a crucial role for success or failure of the union.
While there appears to be a consensus in the literature that the European economies indeed share
some common elements in their aggregate cyclical behavior (see Artis et al., 1998, or Lumsdaine
and Prasad, 2003), opinions diverge concerning the question whether or not this common com-
ponent gained importance for the national economies. Most econometric studies however suggest
increasing similarities between the national business cycles with on-going European integration.2
Reasons for this phenomenon still remain unrevealed though.
Two major sources of economic synchronization tendencies have been discussed in a global con-
text: common shocks and the transmission of country speciﬁc shocks. Several authors, including
Dellas (1986) and Canova and Marrinan (1998), haveshown that in order to simulate realistic output
ﬂuctuations in an international business cycle model, transmission alone is not sufﬁcient. Instead,
the presence of a common exogenous shock appears to be necessary to quantitatively match the data
gathered in empirical studies. Other authors (see, among others, Anderson et al., 1999, or Laxton
and Prasad, 2000) however point out the importance of trade linkages for the synchronization of
international business cycles.
Given the extraordinary economic and political integration of the European economies one might
expect transmission effects to be of predominant importance for synchronizing the European busi-
ness cycles. From this point of view, the German economy might well have an exposed position in
Europe due to its economic weight and its intense inner-European trade linkages. The presumption,
that Germany might have a similar role in Europe as the often cited “locomotive” USA in the world
economy, seems quite plausible; German economic ﬂuctuations thus were comparatively indepen-
dent and inﬂuenced (in a boom as well as a recession) the other European economies’ business
cycles.
Following the work of Canova and Marrinan (1998), this paper presents a multi-country general
1See e.g. Mitchell (1927, 424f.) for an early study. For recent empirical documentation of parallels among interna-
tional business cycles see, for example, Backus and Kehoe (1992) or Gregory et al. (1997).
2See e.g. Artis and Zhang (1997, 1999), or Dueker and Wesche (2001); sceptical: Inklaar and de Haan (2000).Fichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 2
equilibrium model, essentially due to Zimmermann (1997), allowing to quantify the importance
of trade interdependencies for transmitting shocks across countries. Using this model as a tool to
simulate output time series of an artiﬁcial world economy, we contribute to the growing literature
dealing with the European business cycle some insights about sources and mechanisms of this
phenomenon.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized like this: Focusing on the importance of shocks affecting
the German GDP we show that trade-related transmission from Germany to the other European
economies is only of minor importance for the observed synchronization of national business cy-
cles. On the contrary, our ﬁndings suggest that the inﬂuence of common shocks and of technology
spillovers between the countries accounts for most of the parallels in economic performance.
The paper is structured as follows. In order to provide a benchmark for the model and to offer
some ﬁrst insights into the driving forces of synchronization tendencies, section 2 derives some em-
pirical regularities of the European business cycle. Section 3 explains the model economy. Section
4 presents the derivation of steady state equilibria. The methods used to calibrate the model are de-
scribed in section 5. Section 6 gives an overview of the computational procedures used to calculate
the simulated time series. In section 7 we present the results of our simulations and compare them
with the empirical ﬁndings. Section 8 offers some further interpretation and discusses our results.
Section 9 concludes. An appendix presents the sources of the data.
2. Empirical regularities of the European business cycle
In the following, the inﬂuence of Germany’s economic ﬂuctuations on the business cycles of its
European neighbors shall be analyzed by estimating a multi-country vector autoregressive model
and retrieving impulse response functions for a shock affecting the German economy.3
Suchananalysisobviouslyrequiresanoperationalizationoftheterm“businesscycle”. Following
the deﬁnition by Lucas (1977) of the business cycle as “co-movements among different aggregative
time series” and speciﬁcally as “movements about trend in gross national product,” the business
cycle will here be represented by ﬂuctuations of output series (GDP) around their trend. The trend
is identiﬁed using the HP (1600) ﬁlter, thus considering the long-run growth component to be a
smooth but non-deterministic process.4
The study is based on quarterly data taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics cov-
ering the sample from 1970:1 to 2001:4. We estimate a VAR on the log of detrended real GDP of
3A similar analysis is carried out by Canova and Marrinan (1998) for interdependencies between Germany, Japan and
the US.
4Application of the HP ﬁlter has been discussed controversially, as it is subject to the Nelson-Kang (1981) critique to
create spurious periodicity in the data. Additionally, there is no upper bound for the frequencies passing the ﬁlter,
thus short time variations in the data are left as part of the cyclical component. See Baxter and King (1999) for a








2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20








2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20








2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20








2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of Austrian GDP
Figure 1: Impulse response functions of a 1%shock on German GDP with 95% conﬁ-
dence bands.
Austria, Germany5, France, Italy, Japan, UK and the US. Additionally included are a (highly sig-
niﬁcant) dummy for the boom phase in Germany induced by the reuniﬁcation (1991:1 until 1992:4)
and the oil price growth rate as exogenous variable. According to the usual information criteria the
lag length has been set to 1.
The impulse response functions have been simulated using the following Cholesky ordering: US,
Germany, UK, France, Italy, Austria and Japan. With the exception of Japan this ordering follows
the economic weight as indicated by the GDP in 1985 and can – given that bigger countries tend
to inﬂuence smaller countries and not vice versa – be regarded as economically quite plausible.
The exception of Japan seems justiﬁed in view of its less important economic linkages with the
European countries.
Fig.1 plots the mean estimate of the impulse response functions to a 1% shock on German GDP
with 95% conﬁdence bands.6 Obviously, German output shocks have signiﬁcantly large and posi-
tive contemporaneous effects on the European economies, with the reaction in Austria clearly being
higher than in the other countries. As a whole, a positive interdependence between German business
cycles and those of the included European economies can be assumed.
To get an impression of changes in the relationship leading to unreliabilities in the presented re-
sults, in a next step VARs will be estimated for different subsamples. The ﬁrst subsample (“70ies”)
5To avoid a jump in the data an artiﬁcial series has been created by writing back all-German values with West German
growth rates from 1992:1 backwards.
6Economic dependencies between Germany and Europe shall here be analyzed focusing on France, Italy and Austria,
as their economic relationship to Germany has been relatively stable over the examined period and data is readily
available for these countries.Fichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 4
covers the period 1970:1–1979:4, the second subsample (“80ies”) the period 1980:1–1991:4,7 and
the third subsample (“90ies”) the period 1992:1–2001:4.
The impulse response functions for the subsamples (see ﬁg.2) reveal some interesting features of
the European economic system. While in the 1970ies and 1990ies positive shocks on the German
GDP have positive contemporary impacts on the other European economies, business cycle interde-
pendencies between Germany and France as well as Italy appear to be negative and relatively weak
during the 1980ies.8
This pattern of German inﬂuence on the French and the Italian business cycle seems rather un-
usual for an economic integration process that one would expect to lead to an increase in correla-
tion. Having in mind that economic synchronization might be the outcome of transmission as well
as common exogenous shocks, interpretation is straightforward though: In the 1970ies, economic
ﬂuctuations were inﬂuenced by oil price shocks leading to a synchronization of business cycles
worldwide. By contrast, in the 1980ies such symmetric shocks were absent. Instead, business cycle
ﬂuctuations were rather weak and marked by different economic policies: while, e.g., the French
socialist government reacted to the emerging recession in the early 1980ies with expansive ﬁscal
policy, a consolidation policy was implemented in Germany. Already in the early 1990ies, but still
as part of the 80ies subsample, Germany experienced an upswing after its reuniﬁcation, that coin-
cided with a recession in the rest of Europe.9 During the 1990ies European economic integration
ﬁnally led to a reenforcement of economic interdependencies and thus synchronicity.
In contrast, the inﬂuence of Germany on the Austrian business cycle has remained qualitatively
unchanged over time. For all subsamples we observe a positive contemporary reaction of the Aus-
trian GDP in response to a shock leading to a deviation of the German GDP from its trend. While
the French and Italian GDP’s peak response in the 1970ies and 1990ies subsample lag for 1 quar-
ter behind the German shock (a feature not observed in the full sample analysis), Austria’s peak
response in the 80ies and 90ies arises without delay. While this might be interpreted as a sign of
the inﬂuence of common exogenous shocks on both the German and the Austrian economy, we by
no means can rule out the existence of economic linkages transmitting Germany’s economic ﬂuc-
tuations to Austria.10 Assuming that the transmission between highly integrated economies might
be rather fast (having in mind e.g. the capital markets as a transmission channel), the use of quar-
terly data could be too coarse to allow a clear distinction between the inﬂuence of common shocks
and transmitted asymmetric shocks. On the other hand, the observed lag between Germany’s and
the French and Italian peak response can not necessarily be interpreted as an indication for the
7This upper bound is chosen in order to match the break in the data due to the German reuniﬁcation.
8This has been previously noted. See e.g. Seifert (1999) for an analysis of correlation coefﬁcients in different periods.
9Application of the HP ﬁlter induces additional negative correlation. As a result of the strong expansion process after
the German uniﬁcation, the cyclical component of German GDP in the late 1980ies, even though following an
upswing, is assessed rather low, while the other European economies experienced a boom period.
10While it seems plausible to expect the main inﬂuence to be directed from Germany to Austria, an inﬂuence from
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absence of common exogenous shocks and for high importance of transmissive effects. As Mills
and Holmes (1999, 560) note, even if countries experience a common shock, their response might
well be temporarily spread due to differing economic structures or different ways of dealing with
the shock, thus leading to an impulse response function similar to the one obtained in the case of a
transmitted idiosyncratic shock.
Therefore, the possibilities to further investigate the inﬂuence of Germany’s economic ﬂuctua-
tions on the European business cycle on basis of the empirical ﬁndings presented above are quite
limited, as a clear distinction between the importance of transmissive effects and common shocks
for the synchronization of the national cycles is not feasible. Our analysis conﬁrms the previously
observed strong correlation between the output ﬂuctuations in Germany and the other economies
especially in the 1970ies and 1990ies. Evidence of reasons for this close connection remains un-
reliable though. There might be some weak indication of an increase in transmission between
Germany and France as well as Italy in the 1990ies compared to the 1970ies, as the contempora-
neous correlation decreased (thus indicating a diminished inﬂuence of common shocks), while the
lagged reaction of either country’s GDP increased. A conﬁrmation of the hypothesis that German
economic ﬂuctuations inﬂuence the business cycle of the other European countries by means of
transmission has yet to be given, though.
In the following sections we present an international real business cycle model, that is capable
to simulate the observed regularities of the European business cycle. By modifying the model’s
mechanisms and using the empirical ﬁndings presented above as a benchmark, we are able to assess
the importance of different driving forces of the national cycles.
3. The model
The model employed here to further investigate the inﬂuence of German business cycles on the
economic ﬂuctuations of its European neighbors, corresponds in its characteristic features to the
basic real business cycle models presented in the seminal papers by Kydland and Prescott (1982)
and Long and Plosser (1983). Apart from rational expectations and cleared markets due to an
efﬁcient price mechanism, this is in particular the assumption of a pure supply sided stochastic
shock (technology shock) as impulse for economic ﬂuctuations. There is no monetary sector and
no governmental inﬂuence on the economy. The fundamental extension of this model compared
to the baseline models is the opening of the economy to international goods markets.11 In contrast
to the international models decisively developed by Backus et al. (1992) and Baxter and Crucini
(1993), heterogeneities among the countries are taken into account by Zimmermann (1997). The
following exposition is chieﬂy based on his work.
The model’s world economy consists of three countries differing in size and trade related vari-
11International capital markets are not explicitly modeled here. See e.g. Baxter and Crucini (1995) or Cantor and Mark
(1988).Fichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 7
ables. The countries are populated by a constant12 number of representative agents maximizing
their lifetime utility by consuming or investing goods and varying their labor supply over time.
While goods are freely traded internationally, labor is internationally immobile.
The representative agent in country i D 1:::3 maximizes his expected lifetime utility EfUig,









  .1   ni;t/1 
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; 0 <  < 1;0 <  < 1;
 < 1; (1)
where ci;t is the agents consumption at time t, ni;t his working time and thus 1   ni;t his leisure, 
the discount factor, and 
 the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion.
Each country produces one good yi;t according to a Cobb-Douglas production function using
capital ki;t and labor ni;t.13 Production is inﬂuenced by a stochastic technology parameter zi;t:
yi;t D zi;t  ki;t
ni;t
1 ; 0 <  < 1: (2)








T  N.0;V/ is a vector of normally distributed serially inde-
pendent technology shocks with mean 0 and variance-covariance matrix V.14
Capital is accumulated according to
ki;tC1 D .1   /ki;t C xi;t; 0 <  < 1; (4)
where xi;t is gross investment and  the depreciation rate.
Total production of country i, yi;t, is used domestically and abroad. Exports from country i to
country j per capita of country j are symbolized by yi;j;t. Thus, if the population of country i is
given as i:
iyi;t D iyi;i;t C jyi;j;t C kyi;k;t; i 6D j 6D k: (5)
Goods are used for consumption ci;t and investment xi;t, where a limited substitutability between
goods of different origin is handled by introducing an Armington (1969) aggregator G./ into the
household’s problem. This function attaches different weights !i;j to goods of different origin and
12As the model is used to simulate business cycles rather than growth tendencies we refrain from growth in population.
13All variables are in per capita terms of the respective country.
14Contemporary correlation of the technology shock in the respective countries is thus taken into account by the matrix
V and lagged correlation (e.g. due to technological spillovers) by the matrix A.Fichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 8
aggregates them to a single homogeneous good being consumed or invested:







with !i;i;!j;i;!k;i  0;  1:
4. The steady state
In the steady state the trade balances and all markets are in equilibrium. The inﬂuence of technology
shocks is set to zero ("i;t D 0). The technology parameters’ equilibrium value N z is then N z D
.I   A/ 1Z.





1    wini   .r C /ki; (7)
where r is the interest rate and wi the wage. The ﬁrst order conditions are then
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.1   N ni/: (10a,b)
If pi;j or pi;k is the respective price of the foreign good valued in units of the domestic good
(price ratio, bilateral terms of trade), the household’s maximization over the three goods yi;i, yj;i























The trade balance is deﬁned as value of exports less value of imports (expressed in prices of countryFichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 9







yi;k   pi;jyj;i   pi;kyk;i: (12)
In the steady state, the trade balance is in equilibrium (tbi D 0) and the terms of trade are equal









































This completes the description of the model’s steady state.
5. Calibration
As common in RBC theory, the model’s parameters are determined by calibration (see e.g. Kyd-
land and Prescott, 1996). Following Zimmermann (1997) and most of the literature the (quarterly)
interest rate in all countries is set to r D 1%. This yields  D 1
rC1  0:99. The quarterly discount
rate is ﬁxed at  D 0:025, the capital income share  is set to 0:35.15 Rearranging (10a) and setting
N ni D 0:3 as well as N ci






 0:33. For the measure of risk aversion

 D  1 is assumed.
The !i;j are determined by setting
N yi;i
N yi according to the average domestic production share of the




N yi are set such that the countries import ratios from the two other countries match the
average import proportions as reported in the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. Taking into
account, that in the long run N ci C N xi D N yi and the terms of trade in the steady state are equal to one,






The calibration of the technology parameter is based on the estimation of Solow (1957) residuals.
Using time series of employment, real output and capital formation for the respective countries,
we derive a time series for the Solow residual of each country.17 As assumed in the model, zt
evolves according to a VAR(1) process. We thus use the series of the Solow residuals to estimate
15Assuming that factors are paid according to their marginal product, it follows from the production function that the
households’ income share from capital equals .
16Averages cover the period from 1970 to 2000. See the appendix for details.
17See the appendix for sources and details of the aggregation procedure.Fichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 10
the parameters of this VAR process (coefﬁcient matrix A and variance-covariance matrix V) by
ordinary least squares.
6. Synopsis of the computational procedures
As most RBC models, the model discussed in this paper can not be solved analytically due to the
functional forms of preferences and production.18 It will therefore be evaluated numerically using
a dynamic programming technique explained by Hansen and Prescott (1995) and Díaz-Giménez
(1999). This technique requires the optimization problem underlying the consumers and producers
behaviortobewrittenintermsofasocialplanningproblem.19 Thisallowsustoexploittherecursive
structure of the dynamic optimization problem, as the social planner’s problem is structurally the
same in each period: given a ﬁxed capital stock kt and technology parameter zt, he decides about
labor, consumption, investment and imports such that the expected value of the agents’ discounted
life time utility is maximized. This will be the case if the social planner maximizes a weighted sum
of the representative agents’ utility, where the weights are given by the country size i.




























T D Z C Azt C "t (15d)
ki;tC1 D .1   /ki;t C xi;t (15e)
for all i 6D j 6D k and i; j;k 2 f1;2;3g. Substituting (15a)–(15c) in (14) leads to the global

































18Analytical solutions can be found for models with very strict assumptions, e.g. a depreciation rate of 100% and
logarithmic utility as in Long and Plosser (1983).
19According to the Second Welfare Theorem, the decentral maximization problem of consumers and producers can
equivalently be analyzed in terms of a social planning problem, if there are no externalities such as distorting taxes
in the considered model.Fichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 11
s.t. ztC1 D Z C Azt C "t; (17a)
ki;tC1 D .1   /ki;t C xi;t: (17b)
In order to simplify the computations, the global utility function (16) is approximated by a second
order Taylor series around the steady state. Dynamic programming techniques are then used to
derive decision rules from this quadratic function under the linear constraints given in (17a) and
(17b). Using these decision rules we are able to simulate the model economy’s reaction in response
to a numerically deﬁned or a stochastic shock affecting the technology parameter zt.
7. Simulation of impulse response functions
In a next step the model will be used to simulate output series. In analogy to the empirical analysis
carried out in section 2 of this paper these series are detrended using the HP ﬁlter.20 Subsequently,
a VAR is estimated on the detrended series and impulse response functions are determined. The
simulated series are thereby chosen to have a length of 5000 periods, thus reducing the inﬂuence of
singular observations.
The model is simulated under two different scenarios concerning the calibration of the country-
speciﬁc parameters (“Model A” and “Model B”, respectively). Country 1 in both scenarios shall
be Germany, as the main objective of this work is to isolate transmissive effects from Germany to
the rest of Europe. Country 2 in model A is calibrated to mimic the main features of the French
economy, in model B country 2 corresponds to the Austrian economy. Country 3 (“Rest of the
World”, RoW) is parameterized according to an aggregate consisting of the remaining countries
used in section 2.21
As has been noted in section 5, the country speciﬁc calibration of the model’s parameters is lim-
ited to features concerning the respective country’s integration and dependencies in an international
context. Speciﬁcally, these parameters are the weights in the Armington aggregator (determined, as
described above, by the respective import share
yj;i
yi of the country) and the matrices affecting the
level and motion of the technology parameter. Table 1 and 2 report these parameters’ values for the
two model speciﬁcations based on data from 1970:1 to 2000:4.22
The parameters are broadly in line with other estimates in the literature. Some remarkable fea-
tures arise, though: First, the coefﬁcients describing the spillover effects (matrix A), are generally
rather low compared with the estimates presented in the literature. This is especially surprising for
20Detrending the simulated series might seem redundant, as due to the model’s construction the series by deﬁnition
don’t have a growth trend. In order to maintain comparability with our empirical results, ﬁltering the series is
indispensable anyway, because the ﬁltering process removes longer-term ﬂuctuations as trend, even though they
are not to be regarded as trend in the model’s context. Zimmermann (1997) applies the same procedure in order to
allow direct comparison of data and simulated histories.
21RoWA = {AT,IT,JP,UK,US}; RoWB = {FR,IT,JP,UK,US}.
22See the appendix for a detailed description of sources and methods.Fichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 12
Table 1.a: Import shares.
From:


























































Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 1: Calibration of the country speciﬁc parameters in model A.
Table 2.a: Import shares.
From:
























































Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 2: Calibration of the country speciﬁc parameters in model B.Fichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 13
the model B scenario, where one would expect Austria’s technology level to be more dependant on
German technology shocks. The second remark concerns the negative coefﬁcients in the spillover
matrix. Though not signiﬁcant at the 10% level, this point calls for attention. Following Zimmer-
mann (1997, 330f), it might be interpreted as the outcome of a competitive advantage emerging
from a positive technology shock in one country, inducing a negative effect on output and produc-
tivity in the other country. Although this interpretation appears reasonable, we want to point out,
that these estimates are rather unusual compared to similar studies dealing with other countries’
business cycles. We leave to future research an assessment of the stability of these results in a
European context.
Basically, the model allows for two different reasons why technological disturbances in one coun-
try lead to ﬂuctuations in the time series of the other countries. Following Canova and Marrinan
(1998), we distinguish between production interdependencies on the one hand and consumption
interdependencies on the other hand, with production interdependencies being characterized by
contemporary and lagged correlation of the technology parameter, i.e. a direct transmission of the
technology shock.23
In contrast, consumption interdependencies are generated by international trade: a technology
shock in one country leads to a sharp rise in productivity and, due to increasing marginal products,
a rise in labor, investment and output. Additionally, the households, now calculating with a higher
permanent income, increase their consumption. Since the increase in consumption and investment
is higher than the increase in output, imports will rise, which leads in the short run (given initially
unchanged productivity and output) to a decrease in investment in the foreign country. This is
followed by a reduction of the capital stock and a decline of output abroad. In the long run, the
rise of output in the country experiencing the shock leads to a decline of the relative price of this
country’s production and an increase of exports, thus in turn resulting in a rise of investment and
production in the foreign country.
In order to assess the relevance of these two kinds of interdependencies, for each speciﬁcation
of the model three time series are simulated. In a ﬁrst run, the model is simulated as described
above, i.e. with all transmission mechanisms in effect. In a second run the importance of trade for
the international transmission of cycles shall be evaluated. Therefore, the off-diagonal elements of
the matrices A and V are set to zero, thus eliminating the direct international effects of technology
shocks and leaving consumption interdependencies as the only remaining transmission channel. In
a third run, a model reduced by trade linkages (but with restored matrices A and V) is simulated,
i.e. no import goods are demanded. The direct international effects of the technology shock are
then the sole reason for international transmission.
Impulse response functions based on these simulated time series are depicted in ﬁgure 3 and 4.
23Note, that in contrast to Canova and Marrinan (1998) the term ”production interdependencies“ shall here be extended
such that it covers contemporary correlation and is not limited to lagged spillover effects as in Canova and Marrinan




































































































Figure 3: Simulated impulse response functions in model A: Output of the model’s
economies after a technology shock increasing German output by 1%. Depicted are the
reactions with all transmission mechanisms in effect (additionally pictured are the 95%
conﬁdence bands of the empirical analysis), with pure consumption interdependencies






































































































Figure 4: Simulated impulse response functions in model B: Output of the model’s
economies after a technology shock increasing German output by 1%. Depicted are the
reactions with all transmission mechanisms in effect (additionally pictured are the 95%
conﬁdence bands of the empirical analysis), with pure consumption interdependencies
and with pure production interdependencies.Fichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 15
As is apparent when comparing the graphs with the additionally pictured 95% conﬁdence interval
of the empirical analysis, the base model (with all transmission mechanisms in effect) resembles
rather well the broad features of the European business cycle transmission as documented in section
2, ﬁgure 1. In Germany, the shock’s inﬂuence fades out rather quickly and the economy reaches
its long-run growth path after approximately 7 quarters, which is slightly more than the empirically
estimated persistence of a 1% shock on the German GDP. For France, the model’s result shows
a persistence somewhat too small, with the model economy returning to its steady state within
4 quarters, while in the non-structural VAR model of section 2 it takes the French GDP about 5
quarters to reach its trend. In contrast, the model’s prediction for the Austrian output is plainly too
persistent in comparison to the empirical regularities documented above.
In contrast to the model’s predictions concerning the persistency of a shock, the model’s simu-
lation of the contemporary reaction of the European countries’ ﬁts the empirical data impressively
well. As a whole, the model is rather successful in mirroring the differences between the respective
country’s reaction on a shock: Austria experiences a fairly strong and long lasting reaction on a
German technology shock, while the reaction in France is quite weak and dies out quickly.
The modiﬁcations of the model as described in the paragraph further above turn out to be inter-
esting with regards to the question of the German economy’s role for the European business cycle
(see ﬁg. 3 and 4). As becomes unambiguously clear, international trade plays only a minor role
for the transmission of business cycles within the framework of the model. In scenario A as well
as in scenario B production interdependencies are crucial for transmitting impulses across borders.
Despite of strong trade linkages especially between Germany and Austria the trade channel does
not appear to promote business cycles on a large scale.
The importance of production interdependencies suggests a deeper analysis. For this purpose
we distinguish additionally between contemporary correlation according to matrix V and lagged
spillovers according to matrix A (see ﬁg. 5 and 6).24 Thus, the model is simulated ﬁrst with A’s
off-diagonal elements and second with V’s off-diagonal elements set to zero.
For both model speciﬁcations apparently neither lagged nor contemporary production interde-
pendencies are the decisive mechanism to shape the impulse response function. On the contrary, in
both cases contemporary as well as lagged correlation of the technology parameter is necessary to
model the economies’ behavior in order to match the empirical results.
8. Implications and discussion of results
The ﬁndings presented above allow us to give some concluding assessment of the inﬂuence of dif-
ferent synchronization mechanisms: In view of our theoretical analysis the importance of trade
(consumption interdependencies) for the relations between European business cycles is to be as-
24Note that the graphs are plotted by directly simulating the model’s reaction on the technology shock, not, as before,
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Figure 5: Detailed analysis of production interdependencies in model A: Output re-
sponses following a 1% shock on German GDP with full production interdependencies,
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Figure 6: Detailed analysis of production interdependencies in model B: Output re-
sponses following a 1% shock on German GDP with full production interdependencies,
with isolated contemporary correlation and lagged technological spillovers.Fichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 17
sessed rather low. The role of technological interdependencies demands a more sophisticated ex-
amination. As we have shown in the preceding section, contemporary as well as lagged correlation
of the technology parameter is required in order to simulate realistic impulse response functions.
We follow Canova and Marrinan (1998, 144) in interpreting contemporary correlation as a sign
of common exogenous shocks inﬂuencing the national economies. Our results therefore imply, that
exogenous shocks are highly relevant for the existence of synchronization tendencies among the
European economies.
The interpretation of lagged correlation is not as forthright though. High off-diagonal elements
of matrix A might well be interpreted as an indication for the transmission of technology, e.g.
through the export of technically advanced intermediate goods, international knowledge transfers
or imitation of foreign goods. In this sense, the model provides some indication for an inﬂuence
of Germany’s economic developments on the other European nations’. This is not to say that this
inﬂuence necessarily points just in one direction. On the contrary, a comparison of the coefﬁcients
of matrix A does not conﬁrm an unidirectional effect in the case of France, where the inﬂuence ap-
pears to be relatively balanced. The existence of a “German locomotive”, that increases the foreign
productivity by technological spillovers, might be afﬁrmed in the case of Austria, though. Still, we
can not deny the problem already discussed in section 2, that the impression of lagged correlation
might simply be induced by different economic policies to deal with a common (exogenous) shock
or by different structural conditions. This problem is as relevant for the estimation of the technology
shock’s parameters as it was relevant for the estimation of the VARs on GDPs in section 2.
Concluding, we can state that from a theoretical point of view the European business cycle is
mainly based on common exogenous shocks and mutual supply side dependencies. Given, that the
model and the chosen parameter values are a correct description of reality, the importance of trade
related transmission effects is rather low.
This result corresponds to the ﬁndings presented by Canova and Marrinan (1998) for the in-
ternational component of business cycles in Germany, Japan and the US. We can not provide an
indication for a diverging result due to the special economic situation in Europe. Neither can we
conﬁrm the thesis of Germany having due to its size a dominant and thus synchronizing inﬂuence
on the European business cycles, nor does the deep integration of European national economies via
trade appear to have a harmonizing effect.
However, the central role of production interdependencies in the model might at least in part be
provoked by a common (and controversially discussed) characteristic of real business cycle models:
the indeﬁniteness of the Solow residual. The interpretation of this “measure of our ignorance”
(Abramovitz, 1956, 11) as an indicator for a country’s technology level appears inappropriate. As
notes Mankiw (1989), the observed high correlation between the Solow residual and GDP is not
necessarily to be interpreted as an indicator for the important role of technological disturbances for
business cycles, but might well have its reasons in an insufﬁcient separation of technology shocks
from other inﬂuences when estimating the Solow residual. King and Rebelo (1999) argue similarly,Fichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 18
when they point out, that the unreasonable – but for the quantitative ﬁt of standard RBC models
necessary – large volatility of the Solow residual and its central role in business cycle theory is
not reﬂected by a corresponding public perception of these shocks: “If these shocks are large and
important why can’t we read about them in the Wall Street Journal?” (King and Rebelo, 1999, 962).
In this sense, the Solow residual, being additionally biased by measurement problems e.g. due to
changes in capacity utilization, appears quite unsuitable to be a realistic indicator for technology
shocks. According to King and Rebelo (1999), models relying on the Solow residual as driving
process are therefore just with caution to be regarded as useful for actual business cycle analysis.
In the model presented here the dominance of the Solow residual leads almost inevitably to an
overestimation of technological disturbances as a source of economic ﬂuctuations. Trade-related
transmission effects are thus pushed in the background. Our assessment of Germany’s economic
ﬂuctuationsbeingratherirrelevantforthesynchronicityoftheEuropeaneconomies’businesscycles
is therefore to be taken with caution.
9. Conclusion and ﬁnal remarks
This paper investigates the sources of the so called European business cycle, a term referring to the
regularly observed synchronization of the national business cycles in Europe. We concentrate on
the role of Germany and examine, whether or not German economic ﬂuctuations have an important
inﬂuence on the synchronization of national cycles by causing transmissive effects leading to an
adjustment of the other nations’ cycles.
Using a calibrated multi-country general equilibrium model featuring three heterogenous coun-
tries connected by trade linkages, we are able to reproduce the important characteristics of empiri-
cally estimated impulse response functions. The model offers basically two mechanisms, why eco-
nomicﬂuctuationsinonecountrymightleadtoasimilardevelopmentinanothercountry: consump-
tion interdependencies and production interdependencies. While consumption interdependencies,
namely dependencies due to trade on international goods markets, are strikingly irrelevant for the
synchronization of our model economies’ output ﬂuctuations, we show that the central mechanism
to mimic the empirically derived impulse-response functions relies on lagged and contemporary
correlation of technology disturbances.
By identifying contemporary correlation as the outcome of the inﬂuence of common shocks and
interpreting lagged correlation as technological spillovers, we ﬁnally conclude that the European
business cycle is mainly based on exogenous factors. Inner-European synchronization mechanisms
are limited to technological interdependencies. The hypothesis, that Germany might inﬂuence the
other European countries due to its large economic weight, has thus to be rejected. In contrast, we
ﬁnd that the European business cycle owes its existence to a large scale to outside inﬂuences. It
shall be noted, that the relevant exogenous inﬂuences are not limited to obvious impulses as the oil
price shocks in the 1970ies, but that e.g. the US’ business cycle can be regarded as a major sourceFichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 19
of exogenous disturbance (Canova and Marrinan, 1998; SVR, 2001). From this point of view, an
increase in synchronization has to be attributed mainly to an approximation of policies in response
to shocks and a harmonization of structural conditions in Europe.
The model is subject to the regular criticism of real business cycle theory, though. Due to the
restriction to technology shocks as source of economic ﬂuctuations, we allow for a limitation shed-
ding some doubt on our results. An integration of ﬁscal shocks in the model might improve its
reality considerably. Additionally, the high degree of abstraction rules out the possibility to simu-
late governmental actions. Appropriate modiﬁcations of the model promise interesting implications
in view of the further integration of the European economies.
Appendix
Sources of the data
ThedatafortheGDPseriespresentedinsection2weretakenfromtheIMF’sInternationalFinancial
Statistics database. We used quarterly index data at constant prices from 1970:1 to 2001:4. If
necessary, the data was seasonally adjusted using the US Census Bureau’s X12 method. For the
determination of oil price growth rates we also used the time series provided by the IMF.
The import shares (
yj;iCyk;i
yi ) were derived on the basis of annual IMF data from 1970 up to 2000.
We used data of real GDP and of Imports of goods and services, both in national currencies. To
determine the import and GDP ﬁgures for RoW, values were converted in US dollar and summa-
rized. We then removed internal trade according to the IMF’s Directions of Trade Statistics. From
this data, we calculated the import share and their mean value for the period [1970,2000]. The
domestic production share
yi;i
yi is then calculated by subtracting this value from 1.
To determine the relative import shares
yj;i
yi , the import shares are split up according to IMF data.
The Directions of Trade Statistics provide the necessary ﬁgures to calculate each country’s sum of
imports to be considered in our model economy in terms of US dollar. Relating the import value
from one country j to the total sum of imports and multiplying the resulting quota with the import
share derived above leads to the relative import share
yj;i
yi . In the case of the aggregated country
RoW we removed internal trade prior to the calculations.
The time series of the Solow residual were derived by using IMF quarterly data of real GDP from
1970:1 to 2000:4. We then multiplied each national series with a constant factor in order to match
the real GDP in international prices compiled by Heston et al. (2002) in their Penn World Tables.
We proceeded accordingly to derive the ﬁgures for the capital stock. To determine the employment
time series, OECD data was used. If available, we used the civilian employment series provided
in the Main Economic Indicators, otherwise we calculated approximate ﬁgures according to labor
force and unemployment statistics. Data for the aggregated countries were added up. Each series




time series of the technology parameter. These series have been seasonally adjusted and linearlyFichtner: Germany and the European Business Cycle 20
detrended (the model assumes a stationary technology parameter) and were then used to estimate
the matrices A and V in a VAR(1) process.
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